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Nov. 1955] GRIFFITH Co. v. SAN DmGo CoL. FOR WoMEN 501 
( 45 C.2d 501; 289 P.2d 4761 
[L. A. No. 23725. In Bank. Nov. 10, 1955.] 
GlUFFI'l'H COMPANY (a Corporation), Appellant, v. 
SAN DIEGO COLLEGE FOR WOMEN (a Corpora-
tion), Respondent. 
[1] Arbitration-Award- Vacation- Impeachment- Evidence. 
-Although an arbitrator cannot impeach an award by testify-
ing to his fraud or misconduct, his testimony is admissible to 
show what matters were submitted for decision and were 
considered by arbitrators. 
[2] !d.-Award-Vacation-Impeachment-Evidence.-A dissent-
ing arbitrator may testify as to bias, partiality or other mis-
conduct of arbitrators who rendered the award. 
[3] !d.-Arbitrators and Proceedings-Consultation With Out-
siders.-It is proper for arbitrators to obtain from disinter-
ested persons of acknowledged skill such information and 
advice in reference to technical questions submitted to them as 
may be necessary to enable them to come to correct conclusions, 
provided that the award is result of their own judgment after 
obtaining such information. 
[4] !d.-Arbitrators and Proceedings - Consultation with Out-
siders.-An arbitrator who has formed a tentative opinion of 
his own with regard to a dispute submitted to arbitration may 
properly talk the matter over with an attorney to check his 
legal conclusions, where there is no showing that such attorney 
is not a disinterested person. 
[5] Id. -Arbitrators and Proceedings- Consultation With Out-
siders.-All arbitrators need not act as a body when seeking 
independent advice. 
[6] Id.-Award-Vacation-Findings.-The trial court's refusal to 
vacate an arbitration award for alleged misconduct of an arbi-
trator in arriving at his decision through work of an "outside 
attorney" is an implied finding that it believed such arbitrator's 
affidavit that his opinion was reached through his own inde-
pendent thought and was not that of any other person. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Arbitration and Award, § 41; Am.Jur., Arbi-
tration and A ward, § 135 et seq. 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Arbitration and Award, § 31; Am.Jur., Arbi-
tration and Award, § 111. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Arbitration, § 45; [3-5) Arbitra-
tion, § 21.1; (6, 14] Arbitration, § 43; [7] Appeal and Error, 
§ 1298; [8, 9] Appeal and Error, § 1299; [10-12, 20] Arbitration, 
§ 24; [13] Arbitration, § 22; [15, 17] Arbitration, § 25; [16] 
Damages, § 13; (18] Arbitration, § 32; [19] Arbitration, § 37.1. 
[7] Appeal--Questions of Law and Fact - Evidence to Support 
Orders.~An appellate court will not disturh implied flndings 
of faet made trial 0ourt in support of an order, and when 
evidence is it will be presumed that the court found 
every fact necessary to support its order that evidence would 
[8] !d.-Questions Law and Fact-Where Evidence is Docu-
mentary.--In considemtiou of an order made on affidavits in-
of a of an appellate court is 
where oral testimony is presented 
for review. 
[9] !d.-Questions of Law and Fact-Where Evidence is Docu-
mentary.-Where an issue is tried on affidavits, the rule on 
appeal is tlwt those affidaYits favoring a eontention of the 
party establish not only the facts stated therein but 
also all which reasonably may be inferrNl therefrom, and 
where there is snbstantinl conflict in thP facts stated, a deter-
mination of controverted facts by the tri:1l court will not be 
disturbed. 
[10] Arbitration-Award-Signature - Persons Present.- Wherr 
one of the three arbitruto\'s announced his rt>fusal to sign an 
award and that he would dissent therefrom, it was not neces-
sary that he be present when the oth(>r two arbitrators signed. 
[11] Id.-Award-Signatm:e---Mode.- Where chairman of arbitra-
tion board of three members a:sked onP of the other arbitrator:; 
who adhered to decision preYiousJy reached, the third arbi-
trator having dissented, to prepare n formal award since he 
was an attoruey, and such attorney prepared and signed the 
award :md delin•red it nwssPili.ter to the chnirman's ofllee 
whrre it was signt;d, having been previously ncknowledged in 
surh office. the mode in which the chairman signed 
tlw award, though not. approved practice, will not justify 
asi<le thE~ award in absence of a showing that thP 
complaining party wns prejudiced. 
[12] Id.-Award--DBlivery to Parties.-A rule of the Standard 
Form of Arbitration Pnll1edure of the American Institute of 
Architects delivery of an award simultaneously to 
each p:uty was complied witb, where the chair-
man of arbitration board of three members received thP 
award which had hccu sig·ned and acknowledged by one of 
otlwr nrhitratrn·s, shortly thereafter he received a telephonP 
caiJ from attonwys and had his secretary dictate 
award to such attorneys' secretnry. thPr(•after he called de-
fendnnt's attorney and announecd that the a ward had been 
signPd him and tlw other arbitrator, the third arbitrator 
<li~sented thPrefrom, nn<l thert'fl fter cop:v of the 
[7] See Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, ~ 614. 
"\ov. 1 GmFFITll Co. v. SAx DIEGO CoL. FOR 
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award was delivered to the dissenting arbitrator cUHI the 
original mailed to defendant's attorney, it therefore 
that each party was notified at the e11rliest possible oppor-
tunity and as nearly simultaneously as could be expected. 
[13] !d.-Arbitrators and Proceedings-Reopening Case for Fur-
ther Testimony.---The chanman of an arbitration board of 
three members was not guilty of miseonduct in 
dissenting arbitrator's motion to reopen the case to 
additional evrdence where, at the time motior1 made, such 
arbitrator made no ofl'er of and where thP 
complaining party does not what eolllpetent and materinl 
evidence was excluded by reason of denial of the motion or that 
the chairman and third arbitrator were of abuse of 
discretion. 
[14a, 14b] !d.-Award-Modification or Vacation.-The merits of 
a controversy between parties to an arbitration are 
not subject to judicial review. 
[15] Id.-Award-Scope.--Unless specifically requirNl to act in 
conformity with rules of law, arbitrators may base their 
decision on broad principles of justice and and in 
so may expressly or impliedly reject a claim that the party 
might successfully have asserted in judicial aetion. 
[16] Damages-Rule as to Certainty.-Uncertainty as to the fact 
of damage, that is, as to nature, existence or eansC' of damage, 
is fatal to a recovery. 
[17] Arbitration-Award-Compliance and Coextensiveness With 
Submission.--An arbitration award is coextensive with the 
issues submitted where it appears that the arbitration board 
heard and determined (adversely to defendant) to 
a statement of issues presented by plaintiff on a designated 
date, and on subsequent dates heard and considered evidC'nce 
of both parties with respect to such mntter. 
[18] Id.-Award-Presumptions.-lt must be presumed that all 
matters within a submission to arbitration wen• laid before 
arbitrators and passed on by them. (Code Civ. Proc., ~ 1963. 
subd. 18.) 
[19] !d.-Award-Court Review.-Under the arhitrntion statute, 
both superior and appellate eourts must give every intendment 
of validity to an arbitration award, and the burdPn is on one 
claiming error to support h1s claim. 
[20] Id.-Award-Requisites.--The fact that a formal arbitration 
award was prepared by one of three arbitrators •.d10 wm; an 
attorney does not show that the n ward was thn t of ~uch 
attorney rather than of the arbitrntion panel, \\"IJ"n' til;• l'ormnl 
award merely followed an opinion by chau·t11an of 
panel in which such attorney concurred. 
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of I,os 
Angeles County and from orders denying motion to vacate an 
arbitration award and granting motion to confirm award. 
William R. McKay, Judge. Affirmed. 
Proceeding to confirm an arbitration award. Judgment con-
firming award, affirmed. 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Ira C. Powers and Richard L. 
Wells for Appellant. 
Bodkin, Breslin & Luddy, Martin & Mahedy and O'Neill P. 
Martin for Respondent. 
Joseph Scott as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondent. 
CARTER, J .-A rehearing was granted in this case so that 
plaintiff's supplemental reply brief might be considered by 
this court. We have examined said brief and find nothing 
therein which compels any change in our decision as heretofore 
filed. 
Plaintiff Griffith Company appeals from an order denying 
its motion to vacate an arbitrators' award and from a judg-
ment entered on an order confirming the award in favor of 
defendant college. 
A construction contract entered into between the parties 
provided for the erection of certain college buildings for 
defendant by plaintiff on a cost plus and maximum price 
basis. The contract provided that all disputes subject to 
arbitration should be settled by arbitration under the ''Stand-
ard Form of Arbitration Procedure of the American Institute 
of Architects.'' The work was delayed beyond the date set 
for substantial completion and a dispute arose. Plaintiff 
demanded arbitration and eventually an arbitration panel was 
agreed upon: Mr. McKittrick, a contractor, was named by 
the plaintiff; Mr. J. Howard Ziemann, an attorney, was 
named by the defendant; and the two nominees selected the 
third, Paul B. Young, as chairman. After several hearings 
at which evidence and briefs were considered, Mr. Young, as 
chairman, with Mr. Ziemann concurring, agreed on an award 
in defendant's favor. Mr. McKittrick dissented in a written 
opinion in which he (among other things) accused Mr. Young 
of not having arrived at his decision by his own independent 
thought but through the work of an ''outside attorney,'' or, 
in other words, of misconduct sufficient to justify setting aside 
?\oY. 1955] GRIE'FITII Co. v. SA.'.' DrEco CoL. F'OR \Vo:mm .)05 
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the award. Mr. McKittrick's as \Yell as those of Mr. 
Young and Mr. Ziemann are on file. 
[1] We said in Sapp v. Barenfeld, 34 Cal.2d 515, 523 [212 
P .2d 2:33 J, that ''although an arbitrator cannot impeach the 
avvard by testifying to his fraud or misconduct, his testimony 
is admissible to show what matters were submitted for decision 
and were considered by the arbitrators." This apparently, 
the general rule. In Commercial Arbitrations and A wards, by 
it is said: '' "'\Vhile ordinarily an arbitrator may not 
testify to his own acts of mistake or misconduct any more 
than he may to those of the members of the arbitral board 
generally, to establish a cause sufficient to defeat or vacate an 
award, it has been held that the complaining party may take 
such testimony of an arbitrator when it implicates the other 
party in the alleged misconduct, partiality. bias. or corrupt 
action. 
[2] ''Again, in the case of a dissenting arbitrator, the 
award not being his, it is uniformly held that he may testify 
as to the bias, partiality or other misconduct of the arbitrators 
who rendered the award in question the same as any other 
witness.'' ( § 365, p. 787.) 
McKittrick, the dissenting arbitrator, by affidavit, stated 
that Mr. Young, prior to full discussion by the panel members. 
had submitted the matter to an unnamed attorney who had 
drafted an opinion; that Mr. Young, at a meeting, signed 
the original and gave it and a copy thereof to McKittrick; 
that Mr. Young and Mr. Ziemann desired then and there to 
make an award but because of Mr. McKittrick's opposition. 
agreed to a further meeting. At the next meeting, McKittrick 
moved, on behalf of plaintiff, to reopen the proceedings to 
permit further testimony on the "items of damage"; that the 
motion was denied. It is also claimed that Mr. Young and 
:\Ir. Ziemann did not sign the award in each other's presence; 
that the acknowledgment of Mr. Young's signature was made 
prior to the time he signed it; that the award was not delivered 
simultaneously to all arbitrators; that the award went outside 
the issues of the arbitration proceeding. It is also contended 
that Mr. Young was guilty of prejudicial misconduct in refus-
ing to reopen the proceedings to permit additional testimony 
on the part of Mr. McKittrick. 
Mr. Young's affidavit shows that he took his tentative 
written opinion to the meeting with him; that it was in a 
sealed envelope which was not opened nntil after fonr and 
one-half hours of discussion between the three of them. It 
16th; that 
law and the facts. It is further stah·d that after hearing 
the evidence and the ljriefs. J\l;· formed a 
tentative of his owll and that 
attorney with whom had 
so that his 
not 
<)rronc011s. 
erroneons so far as the 
achised attorney that 
from his Oi\'ll notes; that the 
ex~cpt for tlw eilations of 
t ained from tl1e 
that "it was 
con~erued ·'; that 
his was not 
to his secretary 
thereof was his own 
whieh he had ob-
<nvard of lhe arbitratd's iH.'l'C tlw result of affiant's own judg-
ment aud that of said ,J. Zicmanu. 
'' 'l'hat the course of the affiant had in-
formed both his fellow arb.itnnors that he intended to seck 
legal coufirwation of whateYer he might arrive at, 
and no objectiou >Yas made either." 
Articlr 40 of tlle ag-reement between the provides 
that a11y to arbitration shall be submitted to 
arbitration in aecon1ance with the of the Standard 
l<'orm of Arbitration Proeed nre of The American Institute 
of Architects and the" arbitration la>Y." 
It is plaintiif that .l\lr. Young's conduct in 
pri\·ately an attorney constituted misconduct such 
as would the award. In v. Barenfeld, 
supra. 34 Cal.2d 516. 521, the sar:1e point was 
raised. We snid there: " [ T J he to determine the 
amount of tlie award, consulted ex parte with C. L. \Veek'O, a 
skilled cost for an estimate of the labor and mate-
rial eost of the drfccts. They ehech:ed his estimate 
with several building firms and adopted it in making 
their award after this independent i1wcstigation. The award 
was the result of the arbiirators' own judgment, based, how-
ever, on information in this manner. 
"There is no error in such procedure. Although a hearing 
is required on disputrd questions of fact, arbitrators may 
inform themseh·es further by price lists, 
examining materials and cost estimates. (Sturges, 
Commercial Arbitral ion § 217. p. 495.) 
[3] This Hlll.l' be PX parte, wiibont notiee or 
hearing to the parties, for 'it is entirely proper for arbi-
trators, obtain from disinterested 
persons of skill such information and advice in 
reference to teehnical submitted to them, as may be 
necessary to enable them to eorne to eorreet conclusions, 
that the U\Yard is the of their own judgment 
( 1 Meehem. § 810. 
218 U. S. 198 
of M. E. 
; Dore v. Southern 
P. 817] ; Simons v. Mills. 
; Fogler v. 135 Cal. 83, 86 
Inc. v. Bank A.me1·ica, 
[123 l)2d 942]; Gorcl v. Harmon 
P.2d 1 ; Liggett v. Torring-
ton Bldg. Co., 114 Conn. 432 '158 A. 917]; Koepke v. 
E. Liethen Grain Co., 20.} Wis. 75, 77 [236 N.W. ; Twin 
Lakes Reservoir <f; Canal Co. v. Platt Inc., 112 Colo. 
155 [147 P.2d Bank v. Fire 
Ins. Co., 85 :Me. A. 991, 35 Am.St.Rep. 341].) 
It is immaterial whether the of the appraisal is the 
only matter in part of a broader submission. 
( Gord v. Harmon & ~trg v. New England 
Fish Co., 7 Wn.2d 509 Rrrngor Rank 
v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., stt.pra; Sturges, supra, §217, pp. 
495-498.)" (See also Inc. v. Roland, 121 
Cal.App.2d 491, 494 [263 P.2d 445].) 
[4] In view of the foregoing, there appears to be no good 
reason why lVIr. Young should not have talked the matter 
over with an attorney to check his legal conelusions. There 
was no shmving made by plaintiff that the attorney was not a 
disinterested person. [5] vVe made no requirement in the 
Sapp case that all arbitrators must act as a body when seeking 
independent advice and it would appear that such a require-
ment would be unnecessarily burdensome and could lead to 
absurd results. [6] The conclusion of the trial court in 
refusing to vacate the award is an implied finding that he 
believed the affidavit of .Mr. wherein it was stated that 
his opinion was reached thought 
and was not that of any other person. [7] "An appellate 
court will not disturb the implied findings of fact made by a 
trial court in support of an order, any more than it will inter-
fere with express findings upon which a final judgment is 
predicated. \Vhen the evidence is com9ieting, it will be pre-
sumed that the court found every faet necessary to support 
order that the So far as it has 
on the weight evidence or the credibility of wit-
nesses, its implied findings are conclusive. 'rhis rule is equall:· 
applicable whether the evidence is oral or documentary. 
[8] In the consideration of an ordrr made on affidavits in-
volving the decision of a question of fact. the apprllate ·~onrt 
is bound the same rule as where oral testimony is pr,oscnted 
for review. ' (4 Cal.Jur.2d § 614. p. 495; People v. Western 
Meat 13 Cal.App. 539, 544 1110 P. 338]: Maselli v. 
E. H. Appleby & Co., Inc., 117 Cal.App.2d 684. 638 [256 P.2d 
618]; Jones v. Lindsey, 114 Cal.App.2d 237. 239 [250 P.2d 
153] ; Schreiber v. Hooker, 114 Cal.App.2d 634, 640 [251 P.2d 
55]; Paulekas v. Paulekas, 117 Cal.App.2d 73, 77 [254 
P.2d 941] .) [9] When an issue is tried on affidavits, the rule 
on appeal is that those affidavits favoring the contention of 
the prevailing party establish not only the facts stated therein 
but also all facts which reasonably may be inferred therefrom, 
and where there is a substantial conflict in the facts stated, 
a determination of the controverted facts by the trial court 
will not be disturbed. ( Ilay11tin v. Rndniclr, 115 Cal.App.2d 
138. 140 [251 P.2d 707]. I 
Paragraph 14 of the Standard Form of Arbitration pro-
vides that the award is to be made in writing and signed by 
a majority of the arbitrators and that it shall be acknowl-
edged when the prevailing law so requires. It is contended 
by plaintiff that Mr. McKittrick was not permitted to partici-
pate in the making of the award, or to see a copy thereof, 
and that the arbitration panel did not meet when the award 
was made. Mr. Young's afiidavit shows that at the close of 
the meeting when he opened his written opinion, he gave 
copies thereof to each of the other arbitrators; that no award 
was made that day, but a meeting was arranged for the follow-
ing day; that he and Mr. Ziemann signed the opinion that 
day; that the next day a meeting was had with Mr. Young 
and Mr. Zeimann adhering to the conclusion previously 
reached and Mr. McKittrick dissenting therefrom; that Mr. 
Young asked Mr. Ziemann to prepare the formal award since 
he was an attorney; that Mr. McKittrick said he would not 
sign the award. It was further stated that a tentative meet. 
ing was arranged for the following day to sign the award 
but that Mr. Young was unable to be there because of another 
business engagement; that Mr. Ziemann prepared and signed 
the award and delivered it by messenger to Mr. Young's ofiice 
where it was signed, having been previouslY acknowledged 
GRIPPrrH Co. v. SAN DIEGO CoL. FoH WmiEN 509 
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the notary in .Mr. Ziemann's office. [10] Plaintiff's con-
tention is, apparently, that rule 14 (heretofore set forth) 
required all the arbitrators to have been together at the 
time the award was signed. Hule ] 4 does not specifleally so 
require. Mr. MeKittriek had announced his refusal to sign 
the award and that he would dissent therefrom. 'rhere 
appears to be no reason why it was necesc-;ary that he be pres-
ent when the other two arbitrators signed. It has been held 
that the arbitrators, having met in consultation at the time 
of their final decision of the case upon the merits. were not 
required to meet again for the mere purpose of signing the 
award. (Campbell v. Inhabitants of Upton, 113 Mass. 67, 71: 
Robinson v. Bickley, 30 Pa. 384; Sturges, snpra, § 219, 
p, 509.) 
[11] Section 1287 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides 
that the a>vard must be in writing and acknowledged or 
proved in ''like manner as a deed for the conveyance of real 
estate." While the manner in which Mr. Young signed the 
award is not approved practice, plaintiff has not shown that it 
was prejudiced thereby. 
In Williston v. City of Yuba City, 1 Cal.App.2d 166, 169, 
170 [36 P.2d 445], an acknowledgment \vas taken by an officer 
out of the presence of the grantor. The court held : ''The 
deed of conveyance was not invalid between the parties 
thereto merely because it was not acknowledged by the gran-
tors. The purpose of an acknowledgment to a deed is evi-
dentiary in character and is required so as to entitle the 
instrument to be recorded or to render it competent evidence 
without further proof. (9 Cal.Jur. 113, § 18; Gordon v. 
City of San Diego, 108 Cal. 264 [41 P. 301]; Knaugh v. 
Baender, 84 Cal.App. 142 [257 P. 606]; Civ, Code, § 1161.) 
The fact that the deed in this case was irregularly aclmowl-
edged out of the presence of the grantors is immaterial ex-
cept for the purpose of determining whether the grantors 
intended to presently convey their title to the land therein 
described when the deed was handed to .Mr. ·weis for the 
purpose of delivering it to the grantee. There is sufficient 
evidence in the record to support the finding of the court to 
the effect that the deed was delivered by the grantors for the 
purpose of conveying title to the property without any condi-
tion or contingency attached thereto and that the delivery 
of the deed was absolute." (See also 1 Cal.Jur.2d, § 28, 
p. 500.) 
[12] Rule 14 of the Standard Form of Arbitration pro-
510 GRIFFITH Co. C.2ci 
vides that the simultaneously to 
each party. Mr. affidavit shows that shortly before 
4 p. m. on October he receiYed the award which had been 
signed and by Mr. Ziemann; that shortly 
thereafter he received a call from plaintiff's attorneys 
and that he had his secretary dictate the award to the at-
torneys' ; that thereafter he called defendant's at-
torney and announced that the award had been signed by 
him and Mr. Ziemann; that thereafter a copy of the award 
was delivered to Mr. McKittrick and the original mailed to 
defendant's attorney [t appears, therefore. that each party 
was notified at the earliest possible opportunity and as nearly 
simultaneously as could be Rule 14 was sub-
stantially complied with. 
[13] It is next contended that Mr. was guilty of 
misconduct in motion to reopen 
for the purpose of additional evidence. Rule 11 
of the Standard Form provides that ''The hearing may be 
reopened at any time before the award is required to be 
made at the discretion of the arbitrators or upon the request 
of a party for good cause shown.'' After Mr. Young had 
disclosed his tentative Me. McKittrick asked for a 
continuance until the next day to give him an opportunity 
to consult with ''his people.'' At the time set for the con-
tinuance he moved to reopen. He made no offer of proof by 
affidavit. Rule 11 leaves the matter of reopening to the dis-
cretion of the arbitrators, or a majority thereof, and plain-
tiff has not shown what and material evidence was 
excluded reason of the denial of its motion ( fl1 oore v. 
G~·ifjith, 51 Ca1.App.2d 389 P.2d 900] ), or that 
Mr. Young and Mr. Ziemann were guilty c1' an abuse of dis-
cretion. 
Plaintiff contends that the decision is arbitrary, harsh 
and inequitable; that it is contrary to law; and that it is not 
coextensive with the issues submitted. [14a] The merits 
of the controversy between the parties are not subject to 
judicial review. Oil Co1·p. v. C. S. T., Ltd., 
29 Cal.2d 233 [174 P.2d ; Kerr v. Nelson, 7 Cal.2c1 
85 [59 P.2d 821] ; Loving ((: Evans v. Blick, 33 Cal.2d 603 
[204 P.2d 23]; 5 Cal.Jur.2d §52, p. 120.) 
It was held in Crofoot v. Blair Corp., 119 Cal. 
App.2d 156, 165 [260 P.2d , that" The opinion and award 
of the arbitrator are the sole to tbe facts 
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''Both the O·wnrr ;:mel the Con1ndor \\'PrE' fearfnl that <:er-
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the Contractor to go ahead 
aml start the work without waiting for final working draw-
ings incorporating the changes that were made with the 
understanding that the drawings would be provided clnring the 
progress of the work. The Owner offered evidence to prove 
that the Architect had informed the Contractor that the 
working drawings would not be completecl for six months. 
This, the Contractor denies. Article 3 of the contract pro-
vides that: 
" 'The Architect shan furnish with reasonable prompt-
ness. additional instructions, by means of drawing or other-
wise, necessary for the proper execution of the work.' 
"Actual construction on the job site began on August 8, 
1950. A carpenters' strike prevented the Contractor from 
obtaining skilled carpenters until September 7, 1950. The 
Contractor introdured evidence to prove that because of 
delays in obtaining plans the work progressed very slowly 
during the first four months of the building operation. Con-
sequently, on December 12. 1950, the Contractor wrote to the 
Architect complaining of these delays and, among other 
things, stated : 
" 'Lack of plans and information will require us to take 
more than three months to do work which normally should 
require three weeks. 
'' ' . . This type of operation is expensive and accom-
plishes little. . . . 
'' 'At the present time lack of plans and information pre-
vents us from starting any other units .... ' 
"In this letter the Contractor requested a conference with 
the Owner, and such a conference was subsequently beld. 
The subject matter of that conference is in dispute but, 
thereafter, and on December 18, 1950, the Architect wrote 
to the Contractor and stated that he believed that the confer-
ence had answered the problems raised in the letter of De-
cember 12. On December 19. 1950, the Owner granted the 
Contractor a three months' extension of time within which 
to complete the project. It should be noted no increase in 
contract price was demanded or received by the contractors 
at the time this Change Order was formalized. 
"The Contractor's evidence indicates that the job was de-
layed throughout its entire life because of the Owner's failure 
to promptly furnish plans and information necessary to the 
Contractor. Some 52 Change Orders were executed, but 
these are not included in the Contractor's claim since prices 








Order for the 
and details dnr-
"The Owner bas introduced evidence to prove that many 
other such as labor material shortages, con-
tractor etc .. contributed to the over-all delay of the 
job. The Chairman of the Board is of the opinion that all 
of these faetors eontribntN1 in some to delay the job. 
"It is the Chairman of the Board's conctuswn that the 
Contractor may not recover because, First. it did not comply 
w·ith the provisions in the contract to fhe filing of 
claims, and, Second, he ·1s nnahlP to asc~rlam 1J)hat proportion 
of the costs. over and abovP the r:rmtract pncc, is attributable 
to the Owner's and 1.chat is attn:bntable to 
other factors. 
"First, he decides that Artiele 16 of the contract has no 
application to these That article is limited to 
claims for extra costs caused instructions. not 
by the failure to instructions. Article 31 of the contract 
does apply. It provides that either party shall be reimbursed 
for damages caused by the 
" 'wrongful act or of the other party, or of any-
one employed by him. 
" 'Claims under this clause shall be made in writing to 
the party liable within a reasonable time at the first observ-
ance of ><neh damage, and not later than the time of final 
payment ... 
"The letter of December 12, 1950, does indieate dissatis-
faction with the manner in which were furnished. The 
letter also indicates that 'this type of is expensive 
and accomplishes little.' Bnt the letter does not specifically 
register a claim. It requests a conference. Immediately after 
the conference a three month extension of time was granted, 
with no increase in c011i raet and at least to some degree, 
this extension of time was ir·:.t0d npon the carpenters' 
strike over which the Owner, of course, had no control. 
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written notice was the Con-
tractor to the ~\rchitect or to the Owner directly. 
There is evidence to indicate that many oral complaints were 
made, but it is not unusual in a large construction opera-
tion for both the Architect and the Contractor to orally com-
to one another about the progress of some of the 
work. In the of the Chairman of the Board such 
oral would not put the Owner on notice of the 
fact that his actions were excessive costs whirh would 
result in the assessment of damages against him. The pur-
pose of Article 31 is to give the Owner notice so that he 
may change his course of conduct if, in fact, that course of 
eonduct will result in additional costs. I believe that the 
Owner never bad this opportunity in this case. 
"Moreover, the Contractor agreed to start the operation 
without the customary working drawings usually available 
at the outset of a job. There was bound to be some delay 
because of this and, hence, the mere faet that the job was 
being delayed would not in itself give the Owner notice that 
his activities might be contributing to that delay. 
"But irrespective of the question of liability, we cm£ld 
not award damages in this case because the Contractor has 
not established what proportion of the total damages were 
due to the failure of the Owner to promptly furnish plans. 
As I understand the law, this Board is not empowered to 
arbitrarily assess damages. Article 1 (g) of the contract 
provides that: 
" 'The law of the place of the building shall govern the 
construction of this contract.' 
"Section 3300 of the California Civil Code provides that: 
" 'For the breaeh of an obligation arising from contract, 
the measure of damages ... is the amount which will com-
pensate the party aggrieved for all the detriment z)roxitnately 
caused thereby, or which in the ordinary course of things, 
would be likely to result therefrom.' (Emphasis supplied.) 
"Section 3301 provides: 
" 'No damages can be recovered for a breach of contract 
which are not rlrarly ascertainable in both their nature and 
origin.' (Emphasis supplied.) 
"In the case of Austin v. Roberts, 130 Cal.App. 328, 333 
r2o P.2d 97], the Court stated: 
" 'Conceding that plaintiff suffered a loss of profits, there 
is no evidence showing what part of that loss was caused 
by the wrongful acts of any of tl1e defendants and what part 
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was caused by the sale of his property .... The burden of 
making the proof rested on the plaintiff.' See also J. J. 
Kelly Co. v. United States (Ct.Cl., 1947), 69 F.Supp. 117. 
118. 
''As a matter of fact Chairman of the Board concludes 
that the execution of 52 Change Orders caused some delay 
We also conclude that certain labor disputes, material short-
ages, difficulties with suppliers, and contractor delays con-
tributed to some extent in the over-all delay in completing thE' 
job. Since I was unable to ascertain what portion of the 
over-all delay is attributable to these various factors I am 
unable to determine the Contractor's damages, if any. 
''The Chairman of the Board, therefore, recommends this 
Board decide in favor of the defendant, SAN DIEGO CoLLEGE 
FOR WOMEN, and against the plaintiff, GRIFFITH CoMPANY 
Both parties shall pay their costs and Attorneys' fees." 
This opinion was signed by Mr. Young and concurred in 
by Mr. Ziemann. The award followed the recommendation 
of the opinion. 
It is at once obvious from a reading of the chairman's 
opinion that it is not "arbitrary, harsh and inequitable" any 
more than any other decision is so to the losing party. The 
decision is argued to be contrary to law in that Mr. Young's 
opinion sets forth that he was unable to ascertain what pro-
portion of the damages was attributable to defendant's fault 
and that he was therefore unable to determine the damages 
proximately caused thereby to plaintiff. 
[15] In Sapp v. Barenfeld, supra, 34 Cal.2d 515, 523, 
we held : ''Arbitrators, unless specifically required to act in 
conformity with rules of law, may base their decision upon 
broad principles of justice and equity, and in doing so may 
expressly or impliedly reject a claim that a party might 
successfully have asserted in a judicial action. ( Gerdetz v. 
Central Oregon lrr. Co., 83 Ore. 576, 580 [163 P. 980] : 
Everett v. Brown, 120 Misc. 349 [198 N.Y.S. 462, 465] ; 
Koepke v. E. Liethen Grain Co., 205 Wis. 75, SO [236 N.W 
544].) The claim must be expressly raised at some time 
before the award." The arbitrators in the instant case were 
not specifically required to act in conformity with other 
than the "prevailing arbitration law." In Crofoot v. Blair 
Holdings Corp., supra, 119 Cal.App.2d 156. 189, it was held: 
"Even if the arbitrator decided this point incorrectly, he did 
decide it. The issue was admitted properly before him 
that such a de-
it is an error of law, 
not reviewable It appears, however, from 
Allen v. Gardner, 126 340 [272 P.2d 99], 
that the chairman not commit an error of law. [16] It 
was there said: ' as to the fact of that 
as to the the damage, is 
fatal. The chairman specifi-
cally sets forth the had not established 
what proportion of were due to the fault 
of the defendant. It appears therefore that the nature, exist-
ence or cause of the was uncertain. 
[17] Plaintiff's contention that the award was not co-
extensive with the issues submitted is also without merit. It 
appears from the record 's affidavit of November 
6, 1953) "That said board of arbitrators heard and determined 
(adversely to defendant) objections to the statement of issues 
presented by plaintiff on 20, 1953, and heard and con-
sidered plaintiff's evidence in said matter on June 15th, June 
22nd, June 23rd and June 24th, and defendant's evidence 
on July 13th, July 14th, 15th and ,July 16th .... " 
Plaintiff's contention appears to be an attempt to reargue 
the issues and the evidence. [14b] As we have heretofore 
stated, the merits of eontroversy between the parties 
are not subject to review (Pacific Vegetable Oil 
Corp. v. C. 8. supra, 29 Cal.2d . [18] "Jt 
must be presumed ·That all matters withi11 . . . a submission 
to arbitration were laid before the arbitrators and passed 
upon by them.' (Code Civ. 1968, ,;ubd. 18.)" ( Cro-
foot v. Blair Holdings Corp, snpra, 119 Cal.App.2d 156, 192.) 
[19] Further, "Under the 1927 statute, it is well settled 
that both before the superior and appellate courts every in-
tendment of must be the award and that the 
burden is upon the one claiming error to support his con-
tention. (Popcorn Co. v. Page, 92 Ca1.App.2d 
448 [207 P.2d 647].)" (Crofoot v. Blair Holdings Corp., 
supra, at page 
[20] There is no merit to plaintiff's contention that the 
award was not that of the arbitration panel bnt of :Mr 
Ziemann. It is true that Mr. Ziemann, an attorney. 
prepared the formal award but that award merely followed 
the opinion by 1\Ir. Young in which Mr. Ziemann 
concurred. It follows, that the award was tbat of 
a majority of the board of arbitration. 
con-
cnrred. 
J .-'l'o me, tl the 
conclusion that the arbitratkn the full 
and fair and unbiased to which the were 
entitled under the fundamental of fair trial. To 
hold that one unknowll to his associates, may seek 
1 he advice of an and then use the opinion prepared 
by that attorney as the award oJ' the arbitrators violates 
every principle of fair trial. If arbitration is to have the 
place in the administration of justice to which it is entitled, 
it must be conducted in accordance with the same rules of 
law which apply to judicial proceedings, insofar as the 
integrity of decision is concerned. 
The identity of the attorney has never been 
disclosed. For all that appears, he may have been a partisan 
who acted with entirely motives. Secret consulta-
tion by a judge with a lawyer who prepared his opinion for 
him would meet with the unqualified disapproval of bench 
and bar. I see no difference between that situation and the 
one shown in this case. 
For these reasons and those stated by Mr. Justice Ashburn 
in the opinion upon which the District Court of Appeal 
set aside the a1vard, (Cal.App.) 280 P.2d 203, I would make 
the same order. 
Appellant's nP<l~HWl for a was denied December 8, 
1955. Edmonds, J., was of the opinion that the petition 
should be granted. 
